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Participants saw a small number of objects in a visual display and performed a visual detection or
visual-discrimination task in the context of task-irrelevant spoken distractors. In each experiment, a
visual cue was presented 400 ms after the onset of a spoken word. In experiments 1 and 2, the cue was
an isoluminant color change and participants generated an eye movement to the target object. In
experiment 1, responses were slower when the spoken word referred to the distractor object than when
it referred to the target object. In experiment 2, responses were slower when the spoken word referred
to a distractor object than when it referred to an object not in the display. In experiment 3, the cue was
a small shift in location of the target object and participants indicated the direction of the shift. Responses
were slowest when the word referred to the distractor object, faster when the word did not have a referent,
and fastest when the word referred to the target object. Taken together, the results demonstrate that
referents of spoken words capture attention.
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To facilitate the processing of visual information, attention is
usually directed at a restricted part of the visual field. By focusing
attention on a particular region of the visual field, processing of
information at and around that location is enhanced. Theories of
visual attention (see Egeth & Yantis, 1997, for a review) are
concerned with how visual attention is deployed within the visual
system, and traditionally make a distinction between two types of
attentional control (also see Yantis, 2000). Attention is goal-driven
(endogenous) when it is intentional and a result of deliberate
strategies on the part of the observer to achieve a particular goal.
For instance, when searching for a green apple, eye movements
may be directed to green objects. Attention is stimulus-driven
(exogenous) when it is controlled by a salient stimulus property,
independent of the observer’s goals and intentions. For instance,
attention can be captured by the sudden appearance of a new object
(Yantis & Jonides, 1984; Jonides & Yantis, 1988).
Theories of visual attention typically focus on the role of visual
information in attentional control. However, in our interactions
with the world in everyday life, visual processing is frequently
informed by information derived from processing in other cogni-
tive domains. For instance, when a speaker refers to an object in
the immediate visual environment, a listener will usually attend to
that object. If the visual system gives priority to visual information
to determine the allocation of visual attention, one would not
expect linguistic information (e.g., spoken words) to interfere with
visual attention, in particular when carrying out a visual task where
the linguistic information is task-irrelevant. Here, we question this
idea, and present data to suggest that task-irrelevant linguistic
information can influence visual attention. We thus follow James
(1890) in considering the idea that words capture attention.
A growing body of experimental work is concerned with the
interaction of visual and linguistic information. Studies using the
“visual-world” paradigm (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; see Tanenhaus, 2007, for a
review) have demonstrated that people readily and rapidly inte-
grate visual and linguistic information when processing spoken
instructions in the context of a task-relevant visual world. In these
experiments, eye movements to referents of linguistic expressions
are initiated with a surprisingly short delay relative to the process-
ing of relevant information in the speech signal. For instance,
Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus (1998) presented participants
with visual displays including four objects and spoken instructions
to manipulate one of the objects, such as “Click on the beaker.”
They found that the odds of fixating the target object over the
distractor objects (whose names were phonologically dissimilar
from the name of the target object) increased as soon as 200 ms
after the onset of the spoken word “beaker.” This is well before the
offset of the spoken word, which was approximately 400 ms in
duration. Given an estimate of 150 to 200 ms for programming and
executing an eye movement (Hallett, 1986; and see Altmann &
Kamide, 2004, but cf. Altmann, in press, who describes circum-
stances in which language-mediation of oculomotor control may
occur in as little as 100 ms following the onset of a word), it
appears that participants very rapidly focused their attention on the
target object, upon hearing the initial sounds of the target word.
Eye movements to visual referents in visual-world studies may
reflect the use of task-relevant strategies by the observer. That is,
a participant may integrate visual and linguistic information in the
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experimental task. Alternatively, the very speed with which par-
ticipants integrate visual and linguistic information (as evidenced
by rapid language-mediated shifts in visual attention observed in
visual-world studies) may indicate that this process proceeds au-
tomatically, that is, independently of the task and hence without
strategic control.
1 This would of course not imply that strategic,
task-based, and/or goal-based processes do not affect eye move-
ments in visual-world studies (see also Salverda, Brown, & Tanen-
haus, in press, for an account of eye movements in visual-world
studies that focuses on goal-based effects). Rather, the idea is that
visual-linguistic integration proceeds automatically, and that this
process influences eye movements in visual-world studies.
The notion that language-mediated eye movements may be
automatic receives further support from studies showing that lis-
teners fixate objects which are only related to the objects that the
unfolding language refers to (e.g., saccades are launched to a piano
on hearing “trumpet”; Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Yee & Sedivy,
2006; cf. Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi, 2003; Meyer, Belke, Telling,
and Humphreys, 2007, and Belke, Humphreys, Watson, Meyer, &
Telling, 2008, for related findings in visual search). Moreover,
recent studies show that language-mediated eye movements occur
even when the scene to which the language refers has been
removed prior to the unfolding of the language (Altmann, 2004;
Altmann, in press; Altmann & Kamide, 2009). Accounts of the
language-mediated control of eye movements, when the scene is
concurrent or absent, or when the language refers only to related
objects, propose that such eye movements come about through
spreading activation from the language-mediated activation of
conceptual structures to the overlapping conceptual structures pre-
viously activated by the contents of the visual scene—this reacti-
vation of the “episodic traces” associated with objects in the
concurrent or prior scene causes eye movements back toward the
locations associated with those traces (Altmann & Kamide, 2007;
cf. Richardson & Spivey, 2000).
The idea that visual attention can be influenced by concurrent
cognitive representations, independently of task, has been explored
recently in work showing that visual attention can be guided by
task-irrelevant contents of working memory (see Soto, Hodsoll,
Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008, for a review). Typically, these
studies use a dual-task procedure including a memory task. For
instance, in experiment 4 of a study by Soto, Heinke, Humphreys,
& Blanco (2005), a trial started with the presentation of a colored
shape which the participant was required to memorize (each trial
concluded with a memory test for this prime stimulus). Subse-
quently, a new visual display appeared consisting of four colored
shapes, each containing a vertical line. One of the lines was
slightly tilted to the left or right. The participant’s task was to
report the orientation of the tilted line. In some trials, one of the
four colored shapes matched the prime. In these trials, participants
were slower to detect the orientation of the tilted line, compared to
trials on which none of the colored shapes matched the prime. This
finding suggests that attention was oriented automatically toward
the shape that matched the shape held in working memory, and that
this affected performance on the discrimination task. Crucially, a
colored shape that matched the prime never contained the tilted
line. The information held in working memory thus disrupted
performance in the discrimination task, even though it was not
relevant for that task. This suggests that guidance of visual atten-
tion by the contents of working memory is an automatic process,
that is, a process that is not the result of a deliberate strategy.
In a closely related study that is particularly relevant for the
current experiments, Soto and Humphreys (2007) compared the
influence of visual and verbal primes on performance in a visual
discrimination task much like the one used in experiment 4 of Soto
et al. (2005). Here, at the beginning of a trial, participants saw
either a visual prime (e.g., a picture of a red square) or a verbal
prime (e.g., the words “red square”) and were required to verbalize
the prime. Interference effects were obtained for visual as well as
linguistic primes. Interestingly, these effects appeared to be of the
same magnitude. This suggests that memorized linguistic primes
are equally effective as memorized visual primes in guiding visual
attention to visual stimuli that match the prime. Interestingly,
interference effects for both types of primes were also found when
the discrimination task was not followed by a memory task, that is,
when participants were required to verbalize but not memorize the
prime—although under those conditions, performance appeared to
be less disrupted by the prime. Taken together, the results of Soto
and Humphreys’ study suggest that visual attention is guided by
information in working memory, and that, where available, ver-
bally produced information is automatically encoded into working
memory (cf. Meyer et al., 2007, who showed that a visual prime
held in working memory influenced the allocation of attention
toward semantically and phonologically related visual objects dur-
ing a subsequent visual search task).
Soto and Humphreys’ (2007) study bears a close relationship to
the current study, which examines the influence of spoken words
on the allocation of visual attention to referents of those spoken
words. However, there are several important differences between
our study and that of Soto and Humphreys (and other, related
studies). Although effects in Soto and Humphreys’ study were
mediated by participants engaging in speech production (i.e., ver-
balization of a prime shape), effects observed in the studies we
describe below are mediated by speech comprehension. Moreover,
although Soto and Humphreys found influences of verbalization
on subsequent visual search, in the current study, we explore more
immediate influences of speech comprehension on visual attention.
In each of three experiments, participants had to respond to a
visual event that generally occurred during the acoustic lifetime of
an unfolding spoken word. Most crucially, we examined the in-
fluence of referential spoken language on processing of these
visual events under conditions where the linguistic information
was purely incidental to the participant’s task. In contrast, in Soto
and Humphreys’ and related studies (e.g., Downing, 2000; Moores
& Maxwell, 2008; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; Soto et al.,
2005), an influence of information in working memory on visual
attention was obtained only under conditions where the experi-
mental task required processing of the prime stimulus (e.g., pro-
ducing a short phrase describing the prime, holding the prime in
memory, or otherwise attending to the prime) immediately before
performing the subsequent visual search or discrimination task.
Thus, even though the prime stimulus was not relevant for the
visual task, it was relevant, as far as the participants were con-
cerned, for the experimental task they were required to perform.
1 For ease of exposition, we use the term “automatic” for task-
independent attentional control.
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ing memory arguably took place only as a result of the mandatory
processing of the prior information. It is thus unclear whether a
linguistic prime would affect performance in a subsequent discrim-
ination task if the prime were truly task-irrelevant, that is, when
processing the linguistic prime is not required for carrying out any
aspect of the experimental task. In our experiments, participants
were not required to process the linguistic information—in fact
they are encouraged to ignore the spoken words.
To summarize, although there is agreement in the literature that
the allocation of visual attention can be influenced by language-
related information, the evidence to-date is less clear about
whether such influences obtain when the processing of the linguis-
tic information is not mandatory, is strategically counter-
productive, and when the linguistic information unfolds across the
same moments in time as does the visual information to which
attention must be directed. The primary goal of the studies de-
scribed below is to establish whether the integration of visual and
linguistic information proceeds automatically. If it does, we would
predict that an object that is referred to by a spoken word captures
attention. To test this prediction, we examined whether a task-
irrelevant spoken word can disrupt performance in a visual detec-
tion task requiring an eye-movement response (experiments 1 and
2) or in a visual discrimination task requiring a manual response
(experiment 3). As outlined in the introduction, attentional capture
is the rapid and reflexive orientation of attention toward a stimulus.
We subscribe to an operational definition of attentional capture put
forward by Yantis (1993, p. 679): “Stimulus-driven attentional
capture can be said to occur only when the attribute that elicits it
is independent of the defining and reported attributes of the target.”
In each of our experiments, we examined whether performance on
a simple visual task involving a display with several objects would
be affected by the presentation of a spoken word that referred to an
object in the visual display and whose onset immediately preceded
(by 400 ms) the task-relevant visual stimulus.
In each of the three experiments, participants were required to
process basic visual properties of objects: Participants were re-
quired to respond to a color change (in experiments 1 and 2) or the
onset of motion (in experiment 3). Importantly, the task-relevant
visual cue that the participant responded to was independent of any
information that might be activated upon hearing a concurrently
presented spoken word. Moreover, a response to a change in color
or the onset of motion does not require accessing higher-level
information, such as an object’s identity or other semantic infor-
mation that might be activated upon seeing an object and/or
hearing its name. Studies using visual matching tasks have shown
that when an observer attends to an object’s basic visual features,
such as color or motion, this does not (automatically) result in
semantic processing of the object (Boucart, Humphreys, & Lor-
enceau, 1995; Humphreys & Boucart, 1997). There is evidence
that listeners activate visually based conceptual information upon
hearing a spoken word, and that this information is used to map
speech onto potential referents in visual-world studies (Dahan &
Tanenhaus, 2005; Huettig & Altmann, 2007). Importantly, how-
ever, in the current set of experiments such information could
interfere with the participant’s task (i.e., color detection or motion
discrimination) only through influencing the allocation of visual
attention. This is because the defining attribute of the target object
(color in experiments 1 and 2, and motion in experiment 3) is
independent of any attributes of the target object that might be
cued by the spoken word.
Experiment 1
In experiment 1, participants generated an eye movement in
response to an isoluminant color change. They were presented with
a visual display including two objects and a central fixation cross.
After a short delay, a spoken word was presented, which referred
to the target object (congruent condition) or to the other object
(incongruent condition). Four hundred ms after the onset of the
word, one of the objects turned green. Participants were instructed
to move their eyes to the target object as soon as they detected the
color change. Of interest was whether this overt shift in visual
attention would be affected by whether or not the spoken word
referred to the target object (note that participants were told
explicitly to ignore the spoken word). Before the execution of an
eye movement, attention is covertly shifted to the area of interest
(Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986). If an object that is referred
to by a spoken word captures attention, we would therefore expect
that visual attention would shift toward that object, even in the
absence of an overt eye movement. In the incongruent condition,
when the word refers to the distractor object, this covert shift in
attention should interfere with the shift in attention that is required
for the initiation of an eye movement toward the target, because
the latter process would require a reorientation of visual attention.
On the assumption that reorienting attention is associated with a
cost, we expected that involuntarily shifting attention toward the
referent of a spoken word would affect the time it takes to initiate
the eye movement to the target object cued by the color change,
and would do so even when an eye movement had not been
initiated toward the named object prior to the color change. Thus,
if an eye movement to the target object is affected by a concur-
rently presented spoken word that refers to an object in the visual
field, this would suggest that listeners automatically shift their
attention to the visual referent of the spoken word.
Participants
Sixteen students at the University of Rochester, all native speak-
ers of American English, took part in the experiment. They re-
ported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing.
Stimuli
Eye movements were recorded from the participant’s right eye
using a head-mounted SR Research EyeLink II eye-tracking sys-
tem, sampling at 250 Hz. Stimuli were presented on an NEC
MultiSync FP 1305X color monitor. Stimulus presentation was
controlled by a PC running ExBuilder experimentation software
(Longhurst, 2006). Average stimulus luminance was measured
using a Minolta LS-110 photometer. Spoken stimuli were pre-
sented binaurally through Sennheiser HD 570 headphones.
Stimuli consisted of 60 pairs of objects, selected from a stan-
dardized set of line drawings of familiar objects (Snodgrass &
Vanderwart, 1980). For the purposes of the experiment, we created
a monochrome gray and a monochrome green version of each
object. To ensure that the gray to green color change (see proce-
dure below) was not associated with a change in luminance, both
1124 SALVERDA AND ALTMANNcolors were calibrated at 15.0 cd/m
2. This was done because
changes in luminance are salient cues which have the potential to
capture attention (Irwin, Colcombe, Kramer, & Hahn, 2000). Im-
ages were presented on a white background (mean luminance of
38.0 cd/m
2). Within each stimulus pair, object names were pho-
nologically dissimilar (e.g., cat and sun). The names of each of the
2  60  120 objects were recorded in randomized order by a
male native speaker of standard American English. Words ranged
in duration from 372 to 830 ms, with an average word duration of
593 ms (SD  93 ms).
Design
The experiment consisted of 12 practice trials followed by 48
experimental trials. Four lists were created by varying, for each of
the 48 experimental trials, which object changed color and which
object was referred to by the spoken word. Thus, in one half of the
trials, the spoken word referred to the target object (congruent
condition), whereas in the other half of the trials, it referred to the
distractor object (incongruent condition). Similarly, in one half of
the trials, the spoken word referred to the object on the left side of
the fixation cross, whereas in the other half of the trials, it referred
to the object on the right side of the fixation cross. Four random-
izations were created by varying the order of experimental trials.
Each of these randomizations was applied to each of the four lists,
yielding a total of 16 different randomized trial lists. Each partic-
ipant was assigned to one trial list.
Task and Procedure
Participants were seated at approximately 50 cm from the com-
puter screen. The lab was dimly lit; the only two sources of light
were the monitor used for stimulus presentation and the monitor
attached to a PC running the eye-tracker, which was located behind
the participant. At the start of the experiment, the eye-tracker was
fitted and calibrated. Participants received instructions that they
would see two objects on the computer screen, and that one object
would turn green. They were instructed to fixate a central cross at
the beginning of each trial, and to move their eyes as quickly as
they could from the central fixation cross to the object that turned
green. Participants received explicit instructions to “make an eye
movement in response to the color change, not in response to the
words that are being spoken.”
The structure of a trial was as follows. First, a fixation cross
(0.5°  0.5°) appeared in the center of the screen. The participant
carefully fixated the cross and pressed the spacebar to trigger a drift
correction of the eye-tracking system followed by the initiation of the
trial. After a delay of a second, the fixation cross turned into an
asterisk (0.5°  0.5°) and two gray objects appeared (Fig. 1). Each
object subtended approximately 8°  8°. The objects were cen-
tered approximately 8° from fixation; the distance between the
centers of the objects was thus approximately 16°. After a delay of
3 seconds, a spoken object name was presented which referred to
one of the two objects on the computer screen. Four hundred
milliseconds after the onset of the spoken word, the asterisk turned
into a fixation cross and one of the two objects turned green. The
objects remained on the screen for 2 seconds following the color
change. Subsequently, a blank screen was displayed for 2 seconds
before the beginning of the next trial.
Results
Twelve trials (1.6% of the data) were discarded because the first
saccade following the color change did not land within an area of
8°  8° from the center of one of the objects. Thirty additional
trials (3.9% of the data) were discarded because the participant
generated a saccade to the distractor object instead of the target
object. We then computed, for each experimental trial, the saccade
latency, that is, the time it took the participant to initiate an eye
movement to the target object following the color change. Trials
with unusually short or long saccade latencies were excluded from
further analysis: 14 trials with a latency of less than 150 ms (1.8%
of the data) and 13 trials with a latency of more than 500 ms (1.7%
of the data). These outlier criteria were chosen on the basis of a
visual inspection of a histogram of saccade latencies. Note that
including the outliers in the analysis did not change the statistical
patterns reported below.
We analyzed the remaining trials, on which participants made a
correct response by generating a fixation to the target object
(91.0% of the data). Of interest was whether there would be a
difference in saccade latencies to the target object between the
congruent condition, where the spoken word referred to the target
object, and the incongruent condition, where the spoken word
referred to the distractor object. On average, latencies were 16 ms
slower in the incongruent condition (308 ms) than in the congruent
condition (292 ms). Saccade latencies were log transformed and
subjected to a multilevel regression model with random intercepts
for participants and items, and condition as fixed effect. The effect
of condition was significant
2 (.047, pMCMC  .0005).
Throughout this paper, multilevel regression models were fit using
the lmer() function of the lme4 package (Bates & Maechler, 2010)
in the free statistics software R (version 2.10.1; R Development
Core Team, 2010). p-values for fixed effects were estimated and
reported as the posterior probability of a Markov Chain Monte
2 The effect of condition was also significant (p  .05 or smaller) when
the data were analyzed with a two-tailed paired t test on log-transformed
saccade latencies averaged across participants or items.
Figure 1. Example of a visual display used in experiment 1. The spoken
distractor word was “cat” or “sun.”
1125 LANGUAGE AFFORDS ATTENTIONAL CAPTURECarlo (MCMC) simulation with 10,000 samples (see Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008, for discussion). The regression models
contained the maximum random-effect structure justified by the
data, as assessed by comparing a model with random intercepts for
participants and items with a model with a random intercept for
participants only, and a model with a random intercept for items
only.
In an additional and more conservative analysis of the data, we
only considered trials on which the participant did not move their
gaze from the fixation cross prior to the color change in response
to hearing the word, and was fixating the cross at the moment of
color change. This analysis thus included only those trials on
which there was no evidence for an overt shift in attention toward
one of the objects upon hearing the spoken word. (For this pur-
pose, and throughout the paper, fixations falling within an area of
1.5° from the center of the fixation cross were considered fixations
to the cross.) Seventeen trials on which the participant moved their
eyes away from the cross after the onset of the spoken word but
prior to the color change were excluded (2.2% of the data; this
included four trials on which the participant fixated one of the
objects). Twenty-two trials on which the participant was not fix-
ating the cross at the time of the color change were also discarded
(2.9% of the data).
The remaining trials corresponded to 85.9% of the data. Aver-
age saccade latencies were 16 ms slower in the incongruent
condition (307 ms) than in the congruent condition (291 ms).
Saccade latencies were log transformed and subjected to a multi-
level regression model with random intercepts for participants and
items, and condition as fixed effect. The effect of condition was
significant (.050, pMCMC  .0005). Taken together, these
results demonstrate that eye movements to the target object were
initiated more slowly when the spoken word referred to the dis-
tractor object than when the spoken word referred to the target
object. This suggests that the object that was referred to by the
spoken word captured attention.
Discussion
In experiment 1, participants performed a simple and purely
visual task where the only requirement was to make an eye
movement toward an object that changed color. Participants had
been explicitly instructed to ignore spoken distractor words, whose
onsets preceded the color change by 400 ms. Nevertheless, our
results demonstrate that the spoken words systematically affected
performance on the visual task. Eye movements to the target object
were initiated faster when the spoken word referred to the target
object compared to when the spoken word referred to the distractor
object. This result suggests that visual attention was allocated to
the objects in the visual environment that were referred to by the
spoken words. The next two studies examine in more detail
whether we can deem such attention allocation as “automatic.”
In experiment 1, we found a linguistic interference effect even
though the spoken distractor words were irrelevant to the experi-
mental task. The distractor word was equally likely to refer to the
target object as to the distractor object and therefore did not
constitute a valid cue to the location of the target object. However,
even though the spoken word was not a valid cue to the location of
the color change (i.e., it was a valid cue on half of the trials and an
invalid cue on the other half of the trials), it is conceivable that
(some) participants may have treated the spoken words as cues to
try to improve their performance by anticipating the location of the
color change. Anecdotal reports from participants suggest that this
is not the case: many participants reported that the spoken words
were very distracting, and that they had trouble trying to ignore the
words. However, the fact that the spoken word frequently referred
to the object that changed color may have encouraged, or contrib-
uted to, the observed interference effect. Thus, from (some of) the
participants’ perspective, the language may not in fact have been
task-irrelevant—the “strategic” use of a cue in service of a task or
goal, even if unintended by the experimenter, would compromise
the interpretation of the modulating effect of that cue as “auto-
matic,” that is, task-independent.
In experiment 2, we addressed concerns about the potential use
of strategies by participants in our initial study. The task in
experiment 2 was identical to that in experiment 1: to generate, as
quickly as possible, an eye movement to an object in a visual
display that turned green. We made two modifications to the
design of our initial experiment. First, visual displays included
four objects. Second, the spoken distractor word never referred to
the target object. The distractor word either referred to an object in
the visual display that did not change color (present condition) or
to an object that was not included in the visual display (control
condition). We predicted that the presentation of a distractor word
that referred to an object in the display would delay the time it took
participants to generate an eye movement to the object that
changed color. If response times are slower in the present condi-
tion than in the control condition this would suggest that in the
present condition, participants directed their attention to the visual
referent of the spoken word and that this shift in attention inter-
fered with the initiation of an eye movement to the target object in
response to the color change. Crucially, the spoken words in this
study had zero validity in respect of predicting the task-relevant
target.
Experiment 2
Participants
Sixteen students at the University of Rochester took part in the
experiment. They were all native speakers of American English.
Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
normal hearing.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus was the same as that used in experiment 1.
Stimuli consisted of 60 sets of 4 objects, selected from a standard-
ized set of line drawings of familiar objects (Snodgrass & Vander-
wart, 1980). One object was designated the role of target object,
that is, the object that would change color. The three distractor
objects were chosen carefully such that their names were phono-
logically dissimilar to the name of the target object. A control word
was selected for each set of objects. The control word was pho-
nologically dissimilar to the names of the objects and closely
matched to the target word in lexical frequency and word length.
It was important to match target and control words so that, for each
item set, potential differences in responses between the present and
control condition could not be explained by differences in lexical
1126 SALVERDA AND ALTMANNproperties of the words associated with each condition. The aver-
age frequency of the target word (estimated from frequency counts
reported in Francis and Kuc ˇera, 1982) was 21.1 per million, and
the average frequency of the control word was 21.0 per million. A
paired t test indicated that the difference in log-transformed fre-
quency between target words and control words (2.49 vs. 2.52)
was not significant, t  1. The average length of the target word
was 4.3 phonemes, and the average length of the control word was
4.5 phonemes. This difference in word length was not significant
in a paired t test, t  1.6, p  .1.
The 60  2  120 words were recorded in randomized order by
a male native speaker of American English. The duration of each
word was measured using speech editing software. Average word
duration was 579 ms (SD  79 ms) for words in the present
condition and 577 ms (SD  93 ms) for words in the control
condition. A paired t test indicated that this difference was not
significant (t  1).
Design
The experiment consisted of 12 practice trials followed by 48
experimental trials. Two lists were created by varying which
spoken word was presented along with a visual display. In one half
of the trials, the word referred to an object in the display (present
condition), whereas in the other half of the trials, the spoken word
did not refer to an object in the display (control condition). For
each set of items, picture positions were determined quasi-
randomly so that throughout the experiment there were four in-
stances of each of the 12 possible combinations of target position
and named distractor position. Four randomizations were created
by varying the order of experimental trials. Each of these random-
izations was applied to each of the two lists, yielding a total of
eight randomized lists. Two participants were randomly assigned
to each randomized list.
Task and Procedure
The procedure was identical to experiment 1, except that the
visual display included four objects, with one object appearing in
each quadrant of the screen. Each object was approximately 6° 
6° in size. The distance between the central fixation cross and the
center of each object was approximately 8.5°. The distance be-
tween the centers of two adjacent objects was approximately 10.5°.
Participants were instructed to fixate the central cross at the
beginning of each trial, and to move their eyes, as quickly as they
could, to the object that turned green. They received explicit
instructions to “make an eye movement in response to the color
change, not in response to the words that are being spoken.”
Results
Trials on which the first saccade following the color change did
not land within an area of 6°  6° from the center of an object
were discarded (133 trials; 17.3% of the data). Forty-seven addi-
tional trials (6.1% of the data) were discarded because the partic-
ipant fixated the distractor object following the color change. For
the remaining trials, we computed the saccade latency, that is, the
time it took the participant to initiate an eye movement to the target
object following the color change. Trials with unusually short or
long saccade latencies were excluded from further analysis: two
trials with a latency of less than 150 ms (0.3% of the data) and
eight trials with a latency of more than 700 ms (1.0% of the data).
These outlier criteria were chosen on the basis of a visual inspec-
tion of a histogram of saccade latencies. Including these outliers in
the analysis did not change the statistical patterns reported below.
We analyzed the remaining trials, on which participants made a
correct response by generating a fixation to the target object
(75.3% of the data). Of interest was whether there would be a
difference in saccade latencies to the target object between the
present condition, where the spoken word referred to a distractor
object, and the control condition, where the spoken word referred
to an object not in the display. On average, saccade latencies were
22 ms slower in the present condition (358 ms) than in the control
condition (336 ms). Saccade latencies were log transformed and
subjected to a multilevel regression model with random intercepts
for participants and items, and condition as fixed effect. The effect
of condition was significant (see footnote 2) (.067, pMCMC 
.0005).
In an additional and more conservative analysis of the data, we
only considered trials on which the participant did not move their
gaze from the fixation cross prior to the color change in response
to hearing the word, and was fixating the cross at the moment of
color change. Eleven trials on which the participant moved their
eyes away from the cross after the onset of the spoken word but
prior to the color change were excluded (1.4% of the data, includ-
ing one trial on which the participant fixated one of the objects).
Twenty-one trials on which the participant did not fixate the cross
at the time of the color change were also discarded (2.7% of the
data).
The remaining trials corresponded to 71.1% of the data. Aver-
age saccade latencies were 20 ms slower in the present condition
(358 ms) than in the control condition (338 ms). Saccade latencies
were log transformed and subjected to a multilevel regression
model with random intercepts for participants and items, and
condition as fixed effect. The effect of condition was significant
(.062, pMCMC  .0005). Taken together, these results dem-
onstrate that eye movements to the target object were initiated
more slowly when the spoken word referred to a distractor object
than when the spoken word referred to an object not in the display.
Discussion
In experiment 2, participants saw an array of four objects and
again performed a simple and purely visual task: to generate an eye
movement toward whichever object turned green. Just like in
experiment 1, participants received explicit instructions to ignore
the spoken distractor word, whose onset preceded the color change
by 400 ms. The distractor word never referred to the object that
changed color and was thus not a valid cue to the location of the
target object on any trial. Nevertheless, we found that the spoken
distractor word interfered with the visual task when it referred to
one of the objects in the visual display: Reaction times for correct
responses were 20 ms slower when the spoken word referred to a
distractor object in the display than when it did not. (The design of
this study does not permit us to conclude that when the word
referred to some other object, not depicted in the array, there was
no distraction effect.) This finding suggests that a spoken word that
refers to a distractor object results in an involuntary shift of
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tion of an eye movement to the target object. The results of
experiment 2 thus converge with those of experiment 1 in sug-
gesting that objects referred to by spoken language capture atten-
tion.
There is one possible objection to our assessment of the spoken
word as not constituting a valid cue to the location of the color
change. On half the trials, that is, in the present condition, the
spoken word always referred to one of the distractor objects.
Therefore, on those trials, the object that the spoken word referred
to would not change color. By identifying that object, participants
could in principle subsequently narrow down the set of objects that
needed to be considered in order to detect the color change.
However, if participants were able to use this strategy to improve
their performance, we would expect to have obtained faster re-
sponse times in the present condition than in the control condi-
tion—contrary to what was observed. For this reason, and in the
context of explicit instructions to generate a response as quickly as
possible, we believe that it is unlikely that the effect of condition
observed in experiment 2 reflects intentional, rapid, and successful
exclusion of the named distractor from the response set.
There are at least two important limitations of the studies
presented thus far. A first limitation is that the effect of spoken
object names on the allocation of visual attention is measured
indirectly. The results show that the auditory presentation of the
name of an object in the visual display affects the time it takes to
initiate a saccade to a target object. The assumption is that an eye
movement is preceded by a shift in visual attention to the location
that will subsequently be fixated. If attention automatically shifts
to the referent of a spoken word, this should make it easier to
generate an eye movement to that object if that object subsequently
changes color, while it should make it harder to generate an eye
movement to a different object if that different object subsequently
changes color. The idea is that generating an eye movement to the
object referred to by the spoken word is easy due to the fact that
attention is already oriented on that object, while generating an eye
movement to an object other than the one referred to by the spoken
word is harder because it requires a reorientation of visual atten-
tion. Nevertheless, the experimental task itself measures the allo-
cation of visual attention only indirectly, that is, through the effect
that orientation of visual attention has on the subsequent initiation
of an eye movement.
It is well known that the primary effect of allocating attention to
a specific location in the visual field is that it enhances processing
of information at that location. Thus, a more direct test of the
automaticity of language-mediated attention shifts would be to
find evidence for attentional capture of objects referred to by
spoken language in a task that directly measures the ease of
processing of visual information at a particular location. In exper-
iment 3, participants performed a visual-discrimination task which
required a perceptual judgment resulting in a manual response,
instead of an eye-movement response. The goal of this experiment
was to examine directly if hearing the name of an object affects the
processing of visual information associated with that, and other,
objects.
A second limitation of experiments 1 and 2 is that the results are
somewhat inconclusive due to the experimental design. Results
from both experiments strongly suggest that visual attention is
allocated to an object when the name of that object is heard. But
evidence concerning the mechanism underlying this effect is
somewhat equivocal. In experiment 1, participants were faster to
initiate an eye movement to the target object when the spoken
word referred to the target object than when the word referred to
the distractor object. This difference in saccade latencies between
the congruent and incongruent conditions is consistent with a
facilitatory effect (when the word refers to the target object), an
inhibitory effect (when the word refers to the distractor object) or
both. In experiment 2, participants were slower to initiate an eye
movement to the target object when the spoken word referred to
one of three other objects in the visual display than when the word
referred to an object not in the display. This difference in response
times between the present and control conditions is consistent with
an inhibitory effect (when the word referred to an object in the
display).
Taken together, the results of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent
with the idea that hearing the name of a distractor object inhibits,
or interferes with, processing of a target object and/or program-
ming of an eye movement to that object. However, the results do
not provide conclusive evidence that hearing the name of a target
object facilitates processing of that object. In experiment 3, we
examined the nature of the effects of the task-irrelevant language
in more detail. For this purpose, we introduced a baseline condi-
tion in order to assess the nature of the interference effect due to
task-irrelevant distractor words in a visual task. In particular, the
baseline condition allowed us to assess whether hearing the name
of an object can facilitate as well as inhibit the processing of visual
information associated with the target object.
Experiment 3 employed a visual-discrimination task. Partici-
pants saw two objects on the computer screen and fixated a central
fixation cross. After a delay of 3 seconds, a spoken word was
presented. Four hundred ms after the onset of the spoken word, one
of the two objects shifted slightly up or down. The task of the
participant was to determine, as quickly and accurately as they
could, the direction of shift (up or down). The visual display
disappeared approximately 60 ms after the target object had
shifted. This was done to prevent participants from making an eye
movement to the object that shifted to assist their response. Spoken
distractor words were presented to assess the influence of spoken
object names on the allocation of visual attention. The distractor
word matched the object that shifted (congruent condition), the
object that did not shift (incongruent condition), or an object not
on the screen (control condition). Importantly, the control condi-
tion provides a baseline that allows to establish whether the effects
we have observed previously are likely due to inhibitory effects,
facilitatory effects, or both.
Experiment 3
Participants
Eighteen students from the University of Rochester took part in
the experiment. They were all native speakers of American English
and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus was the same as that used in experiments 1 and 2.
Stimuli consisted of 60 visual displays, corresponding to 12 prac-
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of two objects, selected from a standardized set of black-and-white
line drawings of familiar objects (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980).
Three words were associated with each of the 48 experimental
displays: the names of the two objects, and a control word. Within
each visual display, the two object names were phonologically
dissimilar (e.g., dog, gun). The control word was phonologically
dissimilar from each of the two object names (e.g., bed) and
corresponded to the name of an object that was not present in the
visual display. For each visual display, the names of the two
objects and the control word were chosen so that they were closely
matched in frequency and word length. Word frequencies were
estimated from frequency counts reported in Francis and Kuc ˇera
(1982). Average frequencies were 26.1 per million for the name
associated with the left object, 26.1 per million for the name
associated with the right object, and 26.0 for the control word. An
ANOVA showed that differences in log-transformed frequency
between the three groups of words were not significant (F(2, 94) 
1). The average length of the name associated with the left object
was 4.0 phonemes, that of the name associated with the right
object 4.1 phonemes, and that of the control word 4.2 phonemes.
An ANOVA showed that differences in word length between these
three groups of words were not significant, F(2, 94)  1.0, p 
.368.
One word was associated with each of the 12 practice displays.
This word referred to the left object for four displays, the right
object for four displays, and to an object not in the display for four
displays. The names of each of the (3  48)  12  156 objects
were recorded in randomized order by a male native speaker of
standard American English. Words recorded for experimental tri-
als ranged in duration from 400 to 875 ms, with an average
duration of 558 ms (SD  84 ms). The average duration of the
name of the left object was 557 ms, that of the right object 551 ms,
and that of the control object 573 ms. An ANOVA showed that
differences in duration between these three groups of words were
not significant (F(2, 94)  1).
Design
Twelve lists were created by varying, for each of the 48 exper-
imental displays, which of the two objects shifted, whether the
object shifted up or down, and which object the spoken word
referred to (i.e., the target object, the distractor object, or an object
not on the screen). Each list had one of the 12 possible combina-
tions of these factors associated with a particular experimental
display. Within each list, four experimental displays were associ-
ated with one of the 12 possible combinations of target object (left
or right), direction of shift (up or down) and condition (congruent,
incongruent, or control). The order of trials was randomized for
each of the 12 lists, with the constraint that the direction of shift of
the target object was not identical on more than four consecutive
trials. A fixed set of 12 randomly ordered practice trials preceded
the 48 experimental trials, with one practice trial associated with
each of the 12 possible combinations of factors detailed above.
One or two participants were assigned to each randomized list.
Procedure
Participants were seated at approximately 50 cm from the com-
puter screen. At the start of the experiment, the eye-tracker was
fitted and calibrated. Participants were instructed to fixate a central
cross throughout each trial. Their task was to identify the direction
of movement of the object that shifted by pressing a key on the
keyboard (the keys “Y” and “H” in the center of the keyboard were
labeled with an arrow pointing upwards and downwards, respec-
tively). Participants were asked to keep the index fingers of their
left and right hand on the response keys throughout a trial. They
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as they could,
without moving their eyes from the fixation cross. Participants
were informed that they would hear spoken words and were
instructed explicitly that “these words are not relevant to the task
that you are performing.”
The structure of a trial was as follows. First, a fixation cross
(0.5°  0.5°) appeared in the center of the screen, flanked by two
objects. Each object subtended approximately 7°  7°, and the
objects were centered approximately 6° from fixation. The dis-
tance between the centers of the objects was approximately 12°.
After a delay of 3 seconds, a spoken word was presented through
headphones. The word referred to the target object (congruent
condition), the distractor object (incongruent condition) or to an
object not on the screen (control condition). Four hundred ms after
the onset of the spoken word, the target object shifted slightly up
or down by about 0.5° (12 pixels, using a screen resolution of
1,024  768 pixels). Five screen refreshes later (i.e., after 59 ms,
given a monitor refresh rate of 85 Hz) the screen went blank. Once
the participant indicated their response by pressing a key on the
keyboard, there was a delay of 2 seconds before the experiment
advanced to the next trial. Every four trials, a small dot appeared
in the center of the screen. The participant carefully fixated the dot
before pressing the space bar to trigger a drift correction for the
eye-tracking system.
Results
Due to slight variation in the timing of stimulus presentation,
which was beyond our control, there were 63 trials (7.3% of the
data) on which the objects remained on the screen for six instead
of five screen refreshes after the target object had shifted. These
trials were included in the analyses. (Note that the same statistical
patterns as described below were found when these trials were
excluded from the analyses.) Seven trials (0.8% of the data) were
discarded because the participant pressed the space bar or another
key on the keyboard instead of one of the two response keys. Trials
with a response time of more than two standard deviations above
the mean response time were considered outliers. These trials were
excluded from further analysis (23 trials, including nine trials with
an incorrect response; 2.7% of the data).
Correct Responses
One hundred forty-two trials (16.4% of the data) were discarded
because the participant’s response did not match the direction in
which the target object shifted. (Given the large number of incor-
rect responses, we analyzed these trials separately; see below).
Trials on which participants correctly indicated the direction in
which the target object shifted corresponded to 80.1% of the data.
Average response times were computed for each of the experi-
mental conditions. Responses were fastest in the congruent con-
dition (707 ms), intermediate in the control condition (738 ms),
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were log-transformed and subjected to a multilevel regression
model with random intercepts for participants, and condition as
fixed effect (using treatment coding, with the control condition as
the baseline). Nested model comparison indicated that including
random intercepts for items did not significantly improve the
model. This suggests that there was little variation in the time it
took participants to make a response as a function of which
particular object (out of the 96 objects comprising experimental
trials) shifted. The effect of condition was significant when com-
paring the congruent condition to the control condition (
.067, pMCMC  .05), as well as when comparing the incongruent
condition to the control condition (.088,p MCMC  .01).
3
In an additional and more conservative analysis of the data, we
only considered trials on which the participant did not move their
gaze from the fixation cross prior to the shift in object position in
response to hearing the word, and was fixating the cross when the
target object shifted. Forty trials on which the participant moved
their eyes away from the cross after the onset of the spoken word
but prior to the shift were excluded (4.6% of the data, including 18
trials on which the participant fixated one of the objects). Forty-
eight trials on which the participant did not fixate the cross at the
time of the shift in object position were also discarded (5.6% of the
data).
The remaining trials corresponded to 69.9% of the data. Re-
sponses were fastest in the congruent condition (698 ms), slower
in the control condition (734 ms), and slowest in the incongruent
condition (825 ms). Response times were log-transformed and
subjected to a multilevel regression model with random intercepts
for participants and condition as fixed effect (using treatment
coding, with the control condition as the baseline). The effect of
condition was significant when comparing the congruent condition
to the control condition ( .064, pMCMC  .05), as well as
when comparing the incongruent condition to the control condi-
tion (.099, pMCMC  .005).
Incorrect Responses
To assess if the linguistic distractors influenced accuracy, we
examined those trials on which participants incorrectly indicated
the direction in which the target object moved. In accordance with
the “more conservative” analysis of correct trials reported above,
we only considered trials on which the participant did not move
their gaze from the fixation cross prior to the shift in object
position in response to hearing the word (resulting in the exclusion
of 21 trials), and was fixating the cross when the target object
shifted (resulting in the exclusion of 11 trials). This was done to
ensure that an incorrect response was not due to an overt shift of
attention to (or toward) the target or distractor object, or to the
participant not fixating the cross at the moment when the target
object shifted.
The proportion of incorrect responses was 16.0% in the control
condition (38 out of 238 responses). Compared with the control
condition, performance was more accurate in the congruent con-
dition (8.7% incorrect; 20 of 229 responses), and less accurate in
the incongruent condition (21.1% incorrect; 52 of 247 responses).
Incorrect responses were subjected to a multilevel logit model,
which predicted the log odds of observing a correct response. The
model included random intercepts for participants, and condition
as fixed effect (using treatment coding, with the control condition
as the baseline). The effect of condition was significant when
comparing the congruent condition to the control condition (
.68, p  .05), and marginally significant when comparing the
incongruent condition to the control condition ( .42,p
.087). (Note that these p values are based on two-tailed z tests).
These results suggest that on those trials where there was no
evidence that participants shifted their gaze to or toward either of
the objects upon hearing the distractor word, participants deter-
mined the direction of shift of the target object more accurately
when the spoken distractor word referred to that object. Thus, the
results of this analysis converge with the response time analysis:
Determining the direction of motion of the object that shifted was
facilitated when the spoken word referred to that object, and
inhibited when the spoken word referred to the other object. Taken
together, these analyses suggest that when a spoken word referred
to an object in the display, attention was rapidly and automatically
allocated toward that object.
General Discussion
Our results show that visual attention is influenced by linguistic
processing. Performance on a simple visual detection or discrim-
ination task was affected by the presentation of the spoken name of
an object in the visual field. In two visual-detection experiments,
participants saw a visual display and generated an eye movement
to an object that turned green. In experiment 1, the visual display
included two objects, one of which turned green. The onset of a
spoken distractor word which referred to one of the objects pre-
ceded the color change by 400 ms. Participants were slower to
initiate an eye movement to the target object when the spoken
word referred to the distractor object than when the spoken word
referred to the target object. In experiment 2, the visual display
included four objects. A spoken distractor word referred to one of
the distractor objects (i.e., an object that did not change color), or
to an object not included in the visual display. Although the spoken
word never referred to the target object, participants were slower
to initiate an eye movement to the target object when the spoken
word referred to one of the distractor objects than when the spoken
word did not have a referent. Experiment 3 replicated the linguistic
interference effect observed in experiments 1 and 2 with a dis-
crimination task that required a manual response. Participants saw
two objects in a visual display and fixated a central cross. One of
the objects shifted slightly up or down, and participants had to
indicate the direction of shift. A spoken distractor word referred to
one of the objects or to an absent object. Participants were fastest
to detect the direction of shift of the target object when the spoken
word referred to that object, slower when the spoken word did not
have a referent, and slowest when the spoken word referred to the
distractor object. Taken together, the results from these three
experiments converge in showing that task-irrelevant spoken ob-
ject names can interfere with performance on a simple visual task.
Importantly, we found that spoken distractor words affected
performance in a visual task even though the one and only task of
3 These effects were also significant (p  .05) when the data were
analyzed with a two-tailed paired t test on log-transformed response times
averaged across participants.
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mental instructions explicitly stated that the spoken words should
be ignored. Our results thus provide stronger evidence for auto-
matic influences of linguistic information on visual attention than
prior experiments where participants were required to process
linguistic information as part of the experimental task (Soto &
Humphreys, 2007). In our experiments, there was no incentive for
participants to process the spoken words, and many participants
reported that they actively tried to suppress processing of the
spoken words once they noticed that the words interfered with the
visual task that they were trying to perform. Nevertheless, our
results clearly show that the spoken words interfered systemati-
cally with the experimental task, even though these words were
task-irrelevant, suggesting that objects that are referred to by
spoken words capture attention. Although we did not manipulate
cue validity systematically (to show language-modulation of visual
attention independently of cue validity), cue validities across the
three experiments were 50% (experiment 1), zero (experiment 2),
or 33% (experiment 3). Moreover, the object referred to by the
spoken word was no more likely to be the target than the other
object(s) in the display. Yet, despite variation in cue validity, the
data consistently showed language mediation of attentional allo-
cation, which is consistent with the idea that the object referred to
by the spoken word captured attention (see Ellsiepen, Ferreira, &
Henderson, submitted, for related and converging evidence, in a
study that focused on manipulating cue validity of spoken distrac-
tors). We conclude, therefore, that language-mediation of the al-
location of visual attention is automatic, defined operationally—in
terms of its mediation irrespective of task-relevance.
One could argue that the linguistic interference effect that we
observed is obtained only because participants deliberately shifted
their attention to whichever object in the visual display matched
the spoken distractor word, in anticipation of the visual cue. This
account of our results would assume that participants, for some
reason, adopted a strategy that violated the instructions provided at
the beginning of the experiment. A priori, it is not clear why
participants would decide on such a strategy, which is particularly
hard to motivate in the context of experiment 2, where the spoken
distractor word never referred to the target object. Moreover, a
large body of research on attentional capture of visual cues has
shown that observers readily adopt specific attentional control
settings that are appropriate for the task that they are required to
perform. For instance, a classic study by Folk, Remington, and
Johnston (1992) showed that abrupt onsets do not capture attention
when the search target is defined as a color singleton. Similar
results have been obtained in many related studies, suggesting that
stimuli that do not match the attentional control setting required for
the experimental task, and which are therefore irrelevant to the
observer’s goals, do not capture attention. In our experiments,
participants were required to adopt an attentional control setting
for the color green (in experiments 1 and 2) or movement (in
experiment 3). These basic visual features are easy to detect, as
properties of objects, and typically do not result in semantic
processing of those objects (Boucart et al., 1995; Humphreys &
Boucart, 1997). In light of results from the attentional control
setting literature showing that participants can readily ignore vi-
sual stimuli, including abrupt onsets that otherwise (for instance,
when no clear attentional control setting is provided by the task)
capture attention, there is no clear explanation why participants in
our studies might have decided to voluntarily shift their attention
to the object that the spoken word referred to—counter to the
experimental instructions. Taken together, our results support the
hypothesis that objects, when referred to by a spoken word, cap-
ture attention.
The classic version of the Stroop task (see MacLeod, 1991, for
a review) famously demonstrates that when a printed word is
perceived, its meaning is accessed rapidly and automatically. In
the standard version of this task, participants are asked to report the
color of a series of printed words. Invariably, the time it takes a
participant to produce the relevant color name is affected by the
meaning of the word. For instance, participants are faster to report
that a word is printed in green when the word is sock than when the
word is blue. Our results bear a resemblance to the Stroop task in
showing that lexical semantics (the meaning of a word) can inter-
fere with the execution of a task in which this knowledge is not
relevant. However, our results go significantly beyond demonstrat-
ing a linguistic Stroop effect in the auditory domain.
Our findings constitute more than a demonstration that spoken
words, like their written counterparts, are processed and recog-
nized automatically. The interference effect that we observed is
mediated by referential processing of spoken language in a visual
context. Reference resolution is a core aspect of language process-
ing, and our results suggest that this process can impinge on the
allocation of attention in the visual system; whether or not the
spoken word referred to an object in the display, and which object
it referred to, determined the nature of the interference effect. Our
data also go beyond the classic Stroop effect because in the Stroop
task, interference effects arise through featural mismatch—for
instance, the color of the letters mismatching with the color that the
word refers to. In our studies, there was no such featural mismatch:
the visual response (manifest as eye movements in the first two
experiments and as a key press in the third experiment) was
contingent on a visual feature that was orthogonal to the featural
dimensions along which the spoken words could be described. The
featural match or mismatch that drove our effects was between the
location of the visual target and the location of the object to which
the spoken word referred. Crucially, the effects we observed
depended on whether the word referred to an object in a specific
location that matched or mismatched the task-relevant location to
which attention had to be directed.
Notwithstanding the differences between our effects and the
interference effects observed in Stroop, there are also important
similarities, at least with respect to theoretical interpretation. In
Stroop interference studies, the participant must attend to one
featural dimension, such as color, at the expense of another, such
as the meaning of the printed word. In our studies, participants had
to attend to the visual change at the expense of attending to the
spoken word. Like in Stroop interference, the automatic attending
to that spoken word resulted in interference (experiments 2 and 3,
and possibly experiment 1) or facilitation (experiment 3, and
possibly experiment 1). In other words, like in Stroop interference
studies, participants in our studies had to attend to the visual
features in their environment, but did not do so at the total expense
of attending to the spoken words. Stroop interference has been
interpreted theoretically in the context of the guided activation
theory of cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Aston-
Jones, & Gilzenrat, 2004) and the biased competition theory (Desi-
mone & Duncan, 1995). According to these accounts, attention can
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of the competition between concurrently active representations.
Thus, the interactions we have found between language compre-
hension and visual attention can be viewed as reflecting competi-
tion between the linguistic and visual representations activated
during each trial. More specifically, the match and mismatch
effects we observed reflected the allocation of attention in the
direction of the visual change balanced against (i.e., in competition
with) the language-mediated allocation of attention either in the
direction of that change or in some other direction. In termed by
Cohen et al (2004), “gated activation” is the influence of the
context on the activation of one set of featural representations or
another (they can be overlapping)—where, “context” can refer to
other inputs to the system (i.e. other than those causing the acti-
vation being modulated), the system’s prior states, and/or the task
goals. In these terms, language can act as a “gate” on attentional
deployment in the visual domain.
To conclude, our results demonstrate that linguistic processing
can influence the allocation of attention in the visual system very
rapidly and automatically. This result may have important impli-
cations for behavior in carefully controlled operating environments
where spoken language may distract an operator from attending to
information that is relevant to their task (e.g., drivers or air-traffic
controllers). The precise conditions under which objects referred to
by spoken language capture attention in more crowded and inter-
active real-life environments, remain an important topic for future
research. Our results show that in a simple visual environment, an
object that is referred to by spoken language captures attention and
interferes with the execution of a simple and purely visual task.
This rapid and involuntary integration of visual and linguistic
information indicates that different domains of cognitive process-
ing show a larger degree of interactivity than is traditionally
assumed.
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